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CULTURE AND CRIME:
Kargar and the Existing Framework for a
Cultural Defense
NANCY A. WANDERERt AND CATHERINE R. CONNORStt
"Ignorance of the law excuses no man."
JOHN SELDEN, TABLE TALK 65 (1689)
"[T]o constitute a crime against human laws, there
must be, first, a vicious will; and secondly, an unlawful act
consequent upon such a vicious will."
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES *21
Anglo-American jurisprudence is a balancing act of
competing rights. The two quotes above summarize the
clash of two of our most fundamental of rights: the right of
society to be safe and to impose collective norms, against
the right of the individual to adhere to his or her own
beliefs and to avoid criminal opprobrium when free of intent
to harm. The debate about whether "culture" should be
viewed as relevant in assessing criminality exemplifies this
clash between individual and societal rights and implicates
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our most basic concepts of innocence and guilt. When, if
ever, should a criminal defendant's cultural background
alleviate or excuse the defendant from responsibility for
conduct that would otherwise result in conviction or
punishment?
Currently, this question is the subject of great interest
and debate, due at least in part to the recent influx of
immigrants to the United States from nations whose
cultures are not based on Western traditions or European
legal principles.' A host of recent articles discuss culture as
a potential defense, ranging from feminist and sociological
perspectives2 to discussions of the existing case law in
1. The recent expansion of non-European immigrant communities has been
attributed to the passage of federal immigration laws, beginning in 1965, that
altered the historic preference for European immigrants. See Doriane Lambelet
Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through Multiculturalism: The Liberals'
Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1120 (1996). Prior to 1965, preference was
expressly given to established European groups, and Japanese immigrants were
barred entirely. See id. at 1167 n.149. Today, however, the majority of the
twenty million immigrants living in the United States came from non-European
countries. See id. In 1992, for example, 29% immigrated from Asian countries
and 44% were from Latin America and the Caribbean. See id. (citing Bruce W.
Nelan, Not Quite So Welcome Anymore, TIME, Fall 1993, at 10, 10 tbl. (special
issue)).
Many commentators believe that increasing numbers of criminal defendants are
asserting a "cultural defense" because of the recent influx of immigrants,
mainly Asians, to the United States. See Holly Maguigan, Cultural Evidence
and Male Violence: Are Feminist and Multiculturalist Reformers on a Collision
Course in Criminal Courts?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36, 56 n.67 (1995) (citing Malek-
Mithra Sheybani, Comment, Cultural Defense: One Person's Culture Is
Another's Crime, 9 LOY. L.A. INVL & ComP. L.J. 751, 751 ("[D]ue to the large
influx of Asians into the United States, a clash between Asian cultures and the
American criminal justice system currently exists.")). Id. at 56 n.67. See also
John C. Lyman, Cultural Defense: Viable Doctrine or Wishful Thinking?, 9
CRIM. JUST. J. 87, 116 & n.186 (1986).
2. See, e.g., Farah Sultana Brelvi, "News of the Weird" Specious Normativity
and the Problem of the Cultural Defense, 28 COLUm. HUI. RTS. L. REV. 657, 663
(1997) (concluding that cultural defense should be allowed in the examination of
individual defendant's circumstances but "the dangerous tendency to
extrapolate the defense and arrive at generalized conclusions about
communities of 'others' must be checked."); Cathy C. Cardillo, Violence Against
Chinese Women: Defining the Cultural Role, 19 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 85, 85
(1997) (examining the utility of the cultural defense in its application to violent
acts against immigrant Chinese women); Alice J. Gallin, The Cultural Defense:
Undermining the Policies Against Domestic Violence, 35 B.C. L. REV. 723, 725
(1994) (arguing that "cultural defenses should not be used because the United
States should not allow other cultures, which do not respect individual liberty
and equality in the same manner as American culture does, to subvert the value
we place on preventing domestic abuse"); Tracy E. Higgins, Anti-Essentialism,
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which cultural factors played a role.'
Although the scholarly discussion on this topic has been
broad, the actual application of such a defense has
generally been infrequent and untested at the appellate
level. For example, at the trial and sentencing level,
anecdotal evidence exists that some courts have taken into
Relativism, and Human Rights, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 89 (1996) (exploring the
theoretical dilemma of reconciling the feminist goal of maintaining a global
political movement while avoiding charges of cultural imperialism "[in the face
of profound cultural differences among women"), id. at 89; Nilda Rimonte, A
Question of Culture: Cultural Approval of Violence Against Women in the
Pacific-Asian Community and the Cultural Defense, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1311, 1312
(1991) (exploring the ways "culture facilitates the decriminalization of violence
against women"); Susan Girardo Roy, Restoring Hope or Tolerating Abuse?
Responses to Domestic Violence Against Immigrant Women, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
263, 290 (1995) (advocating for "a comprehensive program directed and funded
by the federal government [to] send a message to agencies, courts, and potential
batterers and victims that immigrant women have the right to enjoy a non-
abusive life in this country" rather than the use of the cultural defense in
domestic violence cases) [hereinafter Restoring Hope or Tolerating Abuse?], id.;
Melissa Spatz, A "Lesser" Crime: A Comparative Study of Legal Defenses for
Men Who Kill their Wives, 24 COLuM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 597, 597 (1991)
(analyzing three types of legal systems in which a man can kill his wife and
escape punishment); Todd Taylor, The Cultural Defense and its Irrelevancy in
Child Protection Law, 17 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 331, 364 (1997) (advocating
formal recognition of the cultural defense while stressing its irrelevancy in the
area of child protection law); Leti Volpp, Talking "Culture". Gender, Race,
Nation, and the Politics of Multiculturalism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1573, 1616
(1996) (calling for the abandonment of "the ethnocentric notion of the inferiority
of certain cultures").
3. See, e.g., Thomas D. Barton, Troublesome Connections: The Law and Post-
Enlightenment Culture, 47 EMORY L.J. 163 (1998); Carolyn Choi, Application of
a Cultural Defense in Criminal Proceedings, 8 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 80 (1990);
Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The Seattle Compromise: Multicultural Sensitivity
and Americanization, 47 DuKE L.J. 717 (1998); Michael Fischer, The Human
Rights Implications of a "Cultural Defense," 6 CAL. INTERDISc. L.J. 663 (1998);
Taryn F. Goldstein, Cultural Conflicts in Court: Should the American Criminal
Justice System Formally Recognize a "Cultural Defense"?, 99 DicK. L. REV. 141
(1994); Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of Law is an Excuse-But only for the
Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. REV. 127 (1997); Malek-Mithra Sheybani, Cultural
Defense: One Person's Culture is Another's Crime, 9 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.
J. 751 (1987); Nancy S. Kim, The Cultural Defense and the Problem of Cultural
Preemption: A Framework for Analysis, 27 N.M. L. REV. 101 (1997); Donna L.
Kotake; Survey: Women and California Law, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 1069
(1993); Note, The Cultural Defense in the Criminal Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1293
(1986); Stanislaw Pomorski, On Multiculturalism, Concepts of Crime, and the
"De Minimis" Defense, 1997 BYU L. REv. 51; Cassandra Terhune, Cultural and
Religious Defenses to Child Abuse and Neglect, 14 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW
152 (1997); Sharon M. Tomao, The Cultural Defense: Traditional or Formal, 10
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 241 (1996).
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account, or have allowed to be taken into account, aspects of
a defendant's culture when establishing mens rea or
determining an appropriate sentence.4 Appellate decisions
in which culture has been examined as directly relevant to
the issue of guilt, however, are relatively rare.5
4. See, e.g., Two Iraqi Men Face Hearing, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Nov. 26,
1996, at 22 (stating that father of two underage girls pleaded innocent to child
abuse charges after he forced them to marry, claiming he was following Islamic
culture which allows girls to marry at any age); Myrna Oliver, Immigrant
Crimes Cultural Defense-A Legal Tactic, L.A. TIMES, July 15, 1988, at 1
(stating that Kong Moua, a Hmong tribesman from Laos, charged with
kidnapping and rape, was allowed to plead guilty to the lesser charge of false
imprisonment based on cultural evidence that zij pojniam, or "marriage by
capture" is an accepted form of matrimony in the Hmong culture) [hereinafter
Immigrant Crimes]; Ann W. O'Neil, Judge Rules Exorcism Death Manslaughter
Trial: Two Korean Christian Missionaries are Cleared of Murder in the Killing
of Kyung-Ja Chung During Cleansing Ritual, L.A. TIMES, April 17, 1997, at Al
(stating that judge found two Korean Christian missionaries guilty of
involuntary manslaughter rather than second-degree murder in the stomping
death of a missionary's wife during a demon-cleansing ritual called a sukido);
Dick Polman, When is Cultural Difference a Legal Defense? Immigrants' Native
Traditions Clash with U.S. Law, SEATTLE TIMEs, July 12, 1989, at Al (stating
that Chinese immigrant Dong Lu Chen was convicted of manslaughter and
sentenced to only five years' probation for killing his wife after presenting a
cultural defense that "traditional Chinese notions about the shame of adultery
had propelled him to violence") [hereinafter When is Cultural Difference a Legal
Defense?]; David Talbot, The Ballad of Hooty Croy 'True Believer' Attorney Tony
Serra Fights His Own Version of the Indian Wars-in a Courtroom, L.A. TIMEs,
June 24, 1990, at 16 (describing attorney's use of cultural defense to convince
jury to acquit American Indian defendant of first-degree murder charge). But
see U.S. Justice System Called Ambivalent on Use of 'Cultural Defense' by
Immigrants, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1987, at 6 (noting that attorney opted not to
use cultural defense in case of Fumiko Kmura who killed her children upon
learning her husband had a mistress in keeping with Japanese custom of
parent-child suicide; cultural defense rejected in the case of a Laotian man
convicted of killing his wife because she intended to take a job working for
another man).
5. Cases at the appellate level dealing with the relevance of culture have
typically focused on whether the necessary intent had been formed. See, e.g.,
United States v. Mohammad, 53 F.3d 1426, 1433 (7th Cir. 1995) (determining
that testimony concerning passive role of women in Islamic culture in trial of
husband and wife for conspiracy and fraud did not cause wife's defense to be
"mutually antagonistic" to husband's defense or prevent "the jury from making
a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence"); United States v. Ojo, No.
ACM32094, 1997 WL 66725 at *1 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App.) (considering and
rejecting "appellant's argument that he was raised in Nigeria which has
different cultural views" after he appealed his conviction of carnal knowledge,
adultery, assault of a child, and indecent assault); United States v. Calvin, No.
ACM 30944, 1995 WL 755285, at *1 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App.) (noting that Navajo
victim responded to defendant's consent theory in rape case that relied heavily
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The notable exception is State v. Kargar, in which the
Maine Supreme Judicial Court reversed the conviction of an
Afghani refugee for gross sexual assault. The appellate
court found that the court below had concluded erroneously
that the defendant's cultural background was irrelevant in
determining whether the prosecution should have been
dismissed under Maine's de minimis statute Essentially
finding that it was an abuse of the trial court's discretion
not to dismiss the prosecution, the Court vacated the
conviction and instructed the court to dismiss the case on
remand.8
Because Kargar stands alone in this respect, the case
presents a useful starting point for analyzing the viability
of a cultural defense in American jurisprudence. The
defendant's culture was not invoked in that case simply to
reduce his sentence or dilute mens rea; rather, it absolved
him of guilt and reversed his conviction. The basis of the
on her "failure to report the incident to law enforcement authorities" by
testifying that "reporting such incidents to authorities contradicted her tribal
custom"); Ha v. Alaska, 892 P.2d 184, 195 (Ct. App. 1995) (rejecting defendant's
claim of self defense based on his Vietnamese cultural background that, he
claimed, taught him "that all police are corrupt, that one can expect no help
from the authorities, and that people must take the law into their own hands to
resolve personal disputes"); People v. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. 868, 887 & n.6 (1991)
(ruling that Chinese defendant was entitled to have jury instructed that it could
consider evidence of her cultural background in determining existence or
nonexistence of relevant mental states but that it could not consider evidence of
her cultural background with any issue in a second-degree murder case); State
v. Her, 510 N.W.2d 218, 221 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that prosecutor did
not commit prejudicial misconduct in prosecution of Hmong defendant for first-
degree criminal conduct on Hmong woman when he distinguished defendant's
nationality from that of the jurors in closing argument because the comments
were "primarily a proper commentary" on the "apparent differences between
Hmong and American cultures in their treatment of rape, adultery, and female
sexuality [which] were a major element of the trial"); State v. Lee, 494 N.W.2d
475, 480-81 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that trial court did not abuse its
discretion in allowing testimony on Hmong culture to rebut "misleading
testimony of defendant's witness" intended to "convey the impression that in
the Hmong community the complaints by [the complainants] were not
considered credible because Hmong women who have been raped do not act,
post-rape, as these complainants did."); People v. Singh, 516 N.Y.S.2d 412, 415
(1987) (holding that city ordinance prohibiting possession of exposed knife did
not violate Sikh priests' right to freedom of religion even though Sikh religion
requires priest to carry exposed kirpan, or sword).
6. 679 A.2d 81 (Me. 1996).
7. See id. at 86 (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 12(1)(C) (West 1983)).
8. See Kargar, 679 A.2d at 83.
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decision-application of a de minimis statute-presents a
context for analyzing the cultural defense that is both
practical and philosophically fertile. Because de minimis
statutes are derived from a section of the Model Penal Code
which identifies fundamental values of our legal system, °
exploration of the cultural defense through the lens of a de
minimis statute exposes the basic building blocks of our
criminal jurisprudence. Additionally, alternative arguments
supporting Kargar's innocence, raised by the defendant but
not ruled upon in the case, identify other existing,
constitutional avenues into which the cultural defense
might also fit, including protections of freedom of religion,
parental rights and privacy, and due process. Hence,
examination of the Kargar decision and the arguments put
forth in that case provide a useful overview of the existing
and potential avenues for pursuing a cultural defense.
Using Kargar as a backdrop, this article examines the
cultural defense in the context of each of these multiple
legal doctrines and searches for core common principles.
These common principles can then form a basis for
developing a test for the viability of the cultural defense in
general and explain why and when a cultural defense
should be recognized and accepted in the criminal context.
Such a test can create a template to use in addressing the
myriad questions arising in contemplation of a cultural
defense.
As is usually the case, the first conundrum is
definitional. What is culture?" If a "foreign" culture,
9. A de minimis statute allows the trial judge to dismiss a prosecution if
certain factors are met, establishing that no societal interest exists in pursuing
the case to convict. Currently four states and Guam have a de minimis statute.
See 9 GuAM CODE ANN. § 7.67 (1998); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-236 (1993);
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 12 (West 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 2-11 (West
1995); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 312 (West 1998). Other states give the power
to dismiss through the nol pros, conditional on the court's approval, see MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.12 cmt. at 404 n.20 (1985) (citing ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-1230
(1964); ARIz. R. CRIm. P. 16.6; GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-3 (1997); OHio REV. CODE
ANN. § 2941.33 (Anderson 1996); TEx. CODE CRIm. P. ANN. art. 32.02 (West
1989)), or give the courts the power to dismiss on their own initiative through
similar statutes and court rules, see IOWA R. CRIM P. 27(1); N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 210.40 (McKinney 1993); ORE. REV. STAT. § 135.755 (1997); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-2-4 (1997); WASH. SUPER. CT. CRim. R. 8.3. See also infra note 61 and
accompanying text. These statutes and rules provide a currently existing
avenue for application of a cultural defense.
10. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 212 (1980).
11. See Michael Fischer, The Human Rights Implications of a "Cultural
834 [Vol. 47
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meaning one from another country, may be deemed
relevant in assessing guilt under some circumstances, is the
same true for an "indigenous" culture? Can a father, for
example, defend himself against an incest charge brought
by his daughter on the basis that, in his "backwoods, red
neck" culture, such an act is considered a normal part of
growing up? 2 Are some cultures more worthy of recognition
than others? Should culture be relevant only in sentencing
or mens rea determinations? Should culture be relevant
only as to certain types of crimes?
Ultimately, examination of the currently available
defenses shows that there is nothing really new about a
cultural defense; existing constitutional, statutory, and
common law jurisprudence has already contemplated and
balanced the societal interests at conflict when such a
defense is raised. Although certain fine tuning responsive to
current types and levels of cultural clashes makes sense-
for example, adoption of a de minimis-type statute in all
jurisdictions seems appropriate-radical change in the law
or recognition of a freestanding cultural defense is not
Defense," 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 663, 669 (1998) (citing WILLIAM HAVILAND,
ANTHROPOLOGY 278 (5th ed. 1989) (discussing various definitions and adopting
the following definition for "culture": "[a] set of rules or standards shared by
members of a society which, when acted upon by the members, produce
behavior that falls within a range of variance the members consider proper and
acceptable").
12. A few scholars have urged "nonexculpatory" treatment of offenders who
have come from "rotten" social backgrounds, "based on notions of economic
fairness and reciprocal justice." Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social Background".
Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental
Deprivation?, 3 LAW AND INEQUALITY J. 9, 13-14 (1985). A "nonexculpatory
defense" is a defense that is "unrelated to guilt and desert"; it "says that though
the individual is guilty of a crime deserving punishment, there are other
considerations-for example, public policy, morality, or jurisprudential ideals-
which persuade us not to punish." See id. at 13. Because American society is
based upon "mutuality, these scholars argue, if some segments of society are
deprived of the benefits of the 'social contract,' they are also excused from the
obligations imposed upon them by it." See id. at 14. Attorney William Kunstler
was prepared to raise the defense of "black rage" in the case of Colin Ferguson,
the gunman later convicted of killing six and wounding seventeen white and
Asian passengers on a Long Island commuter train, before his client fired him.
Kimberly M. Copp, Black Rage: The Illegitimacy of a Criminal Defense, 29 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 205, 207 & n.14 (1995). Proponents of the black rage defense
assert that African-Americans become enraged and commit crimes after being
constantly subjected to society's oppressive racism and unfair prejudice. See id.
at n.13. Criminal defendants have also asserted "urban survival syndrome" and
"urban fear syndrome" as defenses. See id. at n.12.
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warranted. Greater or separate acknowledgment of such a
defense would tilt the balance of interests too far in favor of
society's communal concerns to the detriment of individual
rights, including the rights of immigrants to escape the
strictures of their former cultures and live free from harm.
I. STATE OF MAINE V. KARGAR
A. The Charges Against the Defendant
Mohammed Kargar, born in Afghanistan, spent four
years fighting in the Mujahideen, the resistance to the
Russian invasion of his country." He and his family then
emigrated through Iran and Italy to the United States. 4 At
the time of his arrest, he had lived in the United States for
approximately four years. 5 His youngest son, Rahmadan,
was born in America."
Kargar was convicted of two counts of gross sexual
assault under Maine law7 for kissing Rahmadan's penis.18
One count related to a photograph allegedly showing him
kissing the penis when the child was approximately nine
months old. The second count related to an incident in
which he allegedly kissed the child's penis while undressing
the child to go to bed when the child was approximately
fifteen months old.2"





17. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 253(1)(B) (West 1983).
18. See Appellant's Brief at 1, Kargar, (No. 7719, CUM-95-300).
19. See id. at 4.
20. See id. at 6. Interestingly, the police were made aware of the photograph
and the alleged undressing incident by a neighbor of the Kargars. See State v.
Kargar, 679 A.2d 81, 82 (Me. 1996). Kargar's wife testified that the neighbor
saw the photograph when Mrs. Kargar was showing the neighbor the Kargar
photo album. See Appellants Brief at 9, Kargar (No.7719, CUM-95-300). Next to
the photograph of Mohammed with Rahmadan, was a photograph of
Mohammed standing alone in full combat gear, holding a Kalashnikov rifle. See
id. Mrs. Kargar explained to the neighbor that her husband had spent years
killing Russians. See id. at 10. Shortly thereafter, based on the neighbor's
report, the police searched the house for the photograph, and the neighbor's
child testified-and was the sole witness-as to the alleged undressing incident.
See Kargar, 679 A.2d at 82. The neighbor was of Russian origin. See Appellant's
836 [Vol. 47
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Maine's gross sexual assault statute prohibits any
contact between an adult's mouth and a child's penis." No
intent or sexual gratification is required. Hence, when
Kargar admitted he had kissed his child's penis, he
admitted to every element of the crime.22
Maine is one of five jurisdictions that have adopted a de
minimis statute.23 Such statutes are derived from the Model
Penal Code. The language of the Code is essentially
identical to that of Maine's statute, and provides:
Section 2.12. De MAinimis Infractions
The Court shall dismiss a prosecution if, having regard to the
nature of the conduct charged to constitute an offense and the
nature of the attendant circumstances, it finds that the
defendant's conduct:
(1) was within a customary license or tolerance, neither expressly
negatived by the person whose interest was infringed nor
inconsistent with the purpose of the law defining the offense; or
(2) did not actually cause or threaten the harm or evil sought to be
prevented by the law defining the offense or did so only to an
extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation of conviction; or
(3) presents such other extenuations that it cannot reasonably be
regarded as envisaged by the legislature in forbidding the offense.
The Court shall not dismiss a prosecution under Subsection 2 3) of
this Section without filing a written statement of its reasons.
Based on this statutory language, Kargar moved to
dismiss the prosecution against him.5
Brief at 10, Kargar (No. 7719, CUM-95-300).
21. Section 253(1)(B) of Maine's gross sexual assault statute provides, in
pertinent part: "1. A person is guilty of gross sexual assault if that person
engages in a sexual act with another person and: ... B. The other person, not
the actor's spouse, has not in fact attained the age of 14 years." ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17-A, § 253(1)(B) (West Supp. 1998).
22. As to the second, undressing incident, Kargar said it simply did not
happen. See Appellant's Brief at 9, Kargar (No. 7719, CUM-95-300).
23. See 9 GuAM CODE ANN. §7.67 (1996); HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-236 (1993);
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 12 (West 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 2-11 (West
1995); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 312 (West 1998).
24. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.12 (1980).
25. See State v. Kargar, 679 A.2d 81, 83 (Me. 1996).
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B. The Cultural Evidence Submitted in Support of the
Motion to Dismiss and Produced During the Sentencing
Stage
In support of Kargar's motion, the defense submitted
evidence that Kargar's action was considered neither wrong
nor sexual under Islamic law and that Kargar did not know
his action was illegal under Maine law.6 This evidence
included letters from a professor at the University of
Arizona and from the Director of the Afghan Mujahideen
Information Bureau, explaining that kissing the penis of
one's child is not considered either sexual or wrong in
Afghanistan under Islamic law.27 A caseworker from the
Maine Department of Human Services (DHS), who had
investigated the incident after the arrest, also testified. As
an on-site field research assistant in Islamic northern
Nigeria, she had spoken with academics, written to the
deputy ambassador at the Afghan mission in New York
City, and made other investigatory efforts, concluding that
the DHS charges against Kargar should be dropped.' Yet,
she was not permitted by the trial judge to testify as an
expert in the dismissal hearing or even to explain why the
DHS had dismissed the charges.29 The offer of proof
indicated that the case worker would have testified that
DHS had dropped the charges after concluding that
Rahmadan was not in jeopardy and had not suffered any
harm. ° Kargar explained that, consistent with his Islamic
culture, by kissing Rahmadan's penis-a body part that is
"not the holiest or cleanest"-he was showing how much he
truly loved his son.3 '
Further cultural evidence produced at the sentencing
stage included testimony from an Ahman, or priest, in the
Maine Muslim community who stated that the conduct for
which Kargar had been convicted was deemed innocent,
non-sexual, and appropriate in Islamic Afghan culture."
The Ahman testified that, according to the Muslim religion,
kissing a child's penis is not considered a crime; in fact, he
26. See Appellant's Brief at 11, Kargar (No. 7719, CUM-95-300).
27. See Kargar, 679 A.2d at 83.
28. See Appellant's Brief at 11, Kargar (No. 7719, CUM-95-300).
29. See id. at 11-12.
30. See id. at 12.
31. Kargar, 679 A.2d at 83 n.3.
32. See Appellant's Brief at 13, Kargar (No. 7719, CUM-95-300).
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stated, fathers are expected to kiss a child "all over for the
kindness of the child."33 The Ahman further testified that
"it's part of our culture [and] the country [where] we grew
up. It's not a crime." 4 The guardian ad litem also testified
that he had investigated the family's culture, contacted the
Muslims, and learned that the conduct was "no problem.""5
Related to this cultural evidence were the findings of
the investigating social workers, guardian ad litem, and
psychiatrist, who essentially concluded that any harm
suffered by the Kargar children was caused by their court-
ordered separation from their father while charges were
pending against him rather than by any sexual conduct on
his part.
C. The Trial Court's Ruling
The Superior Court, acting also as the fact finder, found
Kargar guilty and rejected the motion to dismiss. 7 The
court found that Kargar had in fact had mouth-to-penis
contact with his child.38 The court also concluded that
Kargar had not had a culpable state of mind, nor sought
sexual gratification when engaging in these acts.
Nevertheless, the court held that his state of mind was
irrelevant to the issue of guilt because (a) neither a culpable
state of mind nor the purpose of sexual gratification was an
element of the crime; and (b) "the innocent nature of the
conduct" was not relevant to a de minimis inquiry. 9
Similarly, the trial court rejected the argument that lack of
harm to the child was relevant to determining whether the
de minimis statute applied, because under the gross sexual
act statute, harm was conclusively assumed by the act
itself." Finally, the court concluded that culture was also
irrelevant to the de minimis inquiry, stating: "I don't think
the legislature intended that there be a variable scale
applicable to people differently depending upon their
33. Id. at 14.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 13.
36. See id. As a condition of his release for the two years the charges were
pending against him, Kargar was not permitted to live with his children. See id.
37. See State v. Kargar, 679 A.2d 81, 83 (Me. 1996).
38. See Appellant's Brief at 14, Kargar (No. 7719, CUM-95-300).




origin... [;] uniformity of application of laws is one of the
principles that is essential to the even application of the
law .
,,4
At the sentencing stage, the court sentenced Kargar to
concurrent terms of eighteen months in prison on both
counts, suspended those terms, and placed him on
probation for three years with the condition that he learn
English.42 In so sentencing him, the trial court repeated its
factual finding that the defendant's conduct was not for
purposes of sexual gratification; that no harm had occurred
to Rahmadan, and that any sentence of jail time would
"send the wrong message." 4' The trial court concluded that
the "disruption" he and his family had "suffered as a result
of [the court] proceedings [was] punishment enough."
44
Although Kargar thus suffered no prison time, under
federal law the two convictions exposed him to automatic
deportation.45 Kargar also had to register his address with
police for the next fifteen years as a convicted sex offender46
and was restricted from attaining various licenses and
privileges.47
D. The Appellate Ruling
On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting
as the Law Court, unanimously vacated the conviction and
instructed the trial court to dismiss the prosecution.48 The
Law Court found, as a matter of law, that the trial court
had erred in finding "culture, lack of harm, and [Kargar's]
41. Id.
42. See Appellee's Brief at 1, State v. Kargar,
79 A.2d 81 (Me. 1996) (No. __ CUM-95-300).
43. See Appellant's Brief at 15-16, Kargar (No. 7719, CUM-95-300).
44. See id. at 16.
45. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (1998) (originally enacted as §
1251(a)(2)(A)(ii)(1994).
46. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A § 11003(1) (West Supp. 1997).
47. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 393(1)(A) (West Supp. 1997)
(prohibiting possession of firearms for persons convicted of a crime that is
punishable by imprisonment for one year or more); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 §
7071(9) (West 1994) (making person convicted of a crime that is punishable by
imprisonment for one year or more ineligible for a license to hunt with a
firearm); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 § 9405(1-A)(D) (West 1983) (making
person convicted of a crime that is punishable by imprisonment for one year or
more ineligible for a private security guard license).
48. See State v. Kargar, 679 A.2d 81, 86 (Me. 1996).
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innocent state of mind irrelevant to [the] de minimis
analysis." 9 Tacitly finding that any ruling not to dismiss
would be an abuse of discretion, the court remanded the
case with instructions to dismiss the prosecution."
Noting that the purpose of the de minimis statute is to
"introduce[] a desirable degree of flexibility in the
administration of the law,"5' the Law Court asserted that
the statute's language expressly requires the trial court to
view the defendant's conduct with "regard to the nature of
the conduct alleged and the nature of the attendant
circumstances," and thus necessarily warrants case-specific
analysis.
52
Pointing out that the authors of the Model Penal Code
justified the statute by recognizing that "courts should have
the 'power to discharge without conviction, persons who
have committed acts which, though amounting in law to
crimes, do not under the circumstances involve any moral
turpitude,' 53 the Law Court agreed with decisions from
other jurisdictions that included as relevant to the de
minimis analysis such factors as the background,
experience, and character of the defendant which may
indicate whether he knew or ought to have known of the
illegality; the knowledge of the defendant of the
consequences to be incurred upon violation of the statute;
the circumstances concerning the offense; the resulting
harm or evil, if any, caused or threatened by the infraction;
the probable impact of the violation upon the community;
the seriousness of the infraction in terms of punishment,
bearing in mind that punishment can be suspended;
mitigating circumstances as to the offender; possible
improper motives of the complainant or prosecutor; and any
other data which may reveal the nature and degree of the
culpability in the offense committed by the defendant.54
Applying this law and these factors to the facts in
Kargar, the court concluded that the third prong of the de
minimis statute, calling for dismissal when the "admittedly
49. See id. at 83.
50. See id. at 86.
51. Id. at 83 (quoting ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 12 cmt. (West 1983)).
52. Id. at 83 (quoting ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 12(1) (West 1983)).
53. Id. at 84 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.12 cmt. at 400 (1985)).
54. See State v. Kargar, 679 A.2d 81, 84 (quoting State v. Smith, 480 A.2d




criminal conduct" of a defendant was not "envisioned by the
Legislature when it defined the crime," applied in this
case.5" In making this determination, the court reviewed the
legislative history of Maine's gross sexual assault statute,
which suggested that the statute was not meant to apply to
"innocent" conduct.56 The court found that the type of
".innocent' touching such as occurred in this case" had "not
forever been recognized as inherently criminal by our own
law."
57
As to Kargar's background, the court concluded that the
record reflected no real dispute that the conduct for which
he had been convicted was "accepted practice in his
culture."5 This factor, along with the lack of any "sexual"
component to Kargar's conduct, the absence of victim
impact, and the severe consequences of conviction,
including registration as a sex offender59 and possible
deportation, were all relevant to the de minimis analysis
and militated in favor of dismissal.6' In sum, to avoid
"injustice," the court held that society's difficulty in
separating 'Kargar's conduct from our notions of sexual
abuse.., should not result in a felony conviction in this
case.
62
II. STATUTORY OR COMMON LAW POWER TO DISMISS
PROSECUTION ON CULTURAL GROUNDS
Kargar teaches that a criminal defendant's culture is
relevant when determining whether to dismiss a
prosecution under a de minimis statute. Indeed, "culture"
cuts across many of the factors acknowledged by the Court
55. Id. (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 12(l)(C) (West 1983)).
56. Id. at 84-85 (citing L.D. 1386, Statement of Fact (112th Legis. 1985)) (In
discussing a change in the statute broadening the definition of the type of
sexual act criminalized as gross sexual conduct, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §
251(1)(C)(1) (West 1983) (current version at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 251
(1)(C)(1) (Supp. 1998)), the Maine Legislature stated that the element of sexual
gratification, which had been included in the statute prior to 1985, could be
removed because, "given the physical contacts described, no concern exists for
excluding 'innocent' contacts.").
57. Id.
58. Id. at 85.
59. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A § 11003 (Supp. 1998).
60. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(i) (1994).
61. State v. Kargar, 679 A.2d 81, 85 (Me. 1996).
62. Id. at 85-86.
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and the drafters of the Model Penal Code as relevant under
a de minimis analysis. For example, culture can explain
why a particular defendant does not know that his or her
action is a crime or does not recognize the consequences
that will be incurred if the law is violated. Actual
knowledge that particular conduct violates the law is
deemed an important factor under the de minimis analysis
because, among other reasons, the defense is not designed
to permit jury or judge nullification. As the Model Penal
Code states, situations requiring a de minimis analysis will
arise when "the customs that control the conduct of a
particular racial or social group are at variance with those
that predominate in the community that motivated the
legislation in question."63 Although the efficacy of such
legislation may be open to question, the Code makes clear
that it is not appropriate for the court or, by implication,
the jury to "nullify laws with which particular segments of
the community disagree. Relief in such cases lies in the
legislature."' Culture also relates to "the nature of the
attendant circumstances"65 surrounding the offense, and
can affect the degree of harm. In Kargar, for example, one
reason why Rahmadan, the alleged "victim," suffered no
adverse impact from his father's conduct was because it was
not deemed wrong in his Muslim community. Finally, the
potential gravity of the consequences of a conviction can be
severely increased by the defendant's immigrant status
under federal deportation laws.
The fact that a defendant's culture can be relevant
under multiple factors examined in a de minimis analysis
demonstrates that culture has a profound connection with
our sense of justice in general. The de minimis statute
constitutes an attempt to create a catchall codification
meant to avoid the injustice of punishing defendants for
"innocent" conduct. That culture can trigger most of the
factors in a de minimis analysis shows the close
relationship between culture and our understanding of
63. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.12 cmt. at 403 (1985).
64. Id. Translating this factor-knowledge that the conduct is illegal-into
the parlance of cultural defense, some commentators distinguish between a
"cognitive" cultural defense, applying when the defendant does not realize that
his or her actions are a crime, and a "volitional" cultural defense, where the
defendant is aware of the illegality of his or her act. See Fischer, supra note 11,
at 669-70.
65. MODEL PENAL CODE sec 2.12.
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guilt. This relationship is demonstrated even more
explicitly under statutes and rules similar to the de
minimis statute, which also create a safety valve to offload
otherwise criminal conduct from prosecution when the
individual circumstances warrant. In addition to the five
jurisdictions that have adopted versions of the Model Penal
Code's de minimis' statute,66 other states have enacted
"interests of justice" statutes or rules of procedure which
can be used in a similar manner by a court to dismiss a
prosecution.
Trial courts in these "interests of justice" jurisdictions
may dismiss prosecutions against the wishes of the
prosecutor in cases when "compelling circumstances require
such a result." In deciding whether to take such a step, the
trial court considers factors such as "the seriousness and
circumstances of the charged offense," the defendant's
background, "the purpose and effect of imposing a sentence
authorized by the offense," "the impact of the dismissal on
public confidence in the judicial system or on the safety and
welfare of the community in the event the defendant is
guilty," and any other relevant information indicating that
"conviction would serve no useful purpose."69 Most juris-
dictions then apply an abuse of discretion standard to any
review of the trial court's decision to dismiss a prosecution.
In considering these factors, the trial court is, in effect,
weighing "the respective interests of the defendant, the
complainant, and the community at large,"7 providing a
mechanism for deviating from the normal balancing result
66. See 9 GuAM CODE ANN. §7.67 (1996); HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-236 (1993);
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 12 (West 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 2-11 (West
1995); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 312 (West 1998).
67. See ALASKA R. CRim. P. 43(c); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385 (West 1982)
(amended 1986); IDAHO R. CRim. P. 48(a)(2); IOWA R. CRIM. P. 27(1); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 631.21 (West 1983) (current version at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 631.21 (Supp.
1999)); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-13-401; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.40
(McKinney 1993); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 815 (1998); OR. REV. STAT. tit. 14, §
135.755 (1997); UTAH R. CRmi. P. 25; VT. R. CRim. P. 48(b)(2); WASH. REV. COD.
tit. 10, 8.3 (West 1990).
68. State v. Sauve, 666 A.2d 1164, 1167 (Vt. 1995).
69. Id. at 1168.
70. See id. at 1166-67. But see State v. Swenson, 809 P.2d 1185, 1187 (Idaho
Ct. App. 1991) (identifying the standard as "whether the trial court erred as a
matter of law"); State v. Blackwell, 845 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Wash. 1993) (requiring
a showing of arbitrary action or government misconduct before a trial court may
dismiss a prosecution in the interests ofjustice).
71. Sauve, 666 A.2d at 1168.
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in individual cases when our generalized notions of justice
require it. Such "interests of justice" statutes or rules seem
to be as available for considering cultural factors as de
minimis statutes. Both mechanisms are designed to act as
safety valves with which to evade strict application of the
law when factors not normally considered in the criminal
judicial process appear relevant in individual situations.
For example, in dismissing cases pursuant to a
longstanding "interests of justice" statute, New York courts
did not focus solely on the legal or factual merits of the
charge, or the guilt or innocence of the defendant, because
such dismissals are based on broader principles of justice.72
Stating that the purpose of the statute was "to give a court
power in appropriate but rare circumstances to allow the
letter of the law gracefully and charitably to succumb to the
spirit of justice," the court in People v. Davis"' dismissed a
drug prosecution against a twenty-year-old defendant as-
piring to become a doctor, because his "character and poten-
tial" warranted such relief. 5 To support its ruling, the court
stated, "The criminal law is at best an imperfect instrument
[that] ... occasionally catches in its net one who, should he
be convicted of an offense, would suffer more grievously
than justice would require, taking into consideration the
nature of his offense, his background, and the possible
future consequences of such conviction."76 In this way, the
court employed the statute as a safety valve, much as the
more modern New York Criminal Procedure Law, Section
210.40, has continued to be applied.77
Whether a court can dismiss an action based on these
de minimis or "interests of justice" principles in the absence
of a statute or rule is more problematic. New York's interest
of justice statute has been traced to the common law writ of
72. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 286 N.Y.S.2d 396, 398-99 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967)
(granting a furtherance of justice dismissal to a twenty-year-old college student,
found in possession of an ounce of marijuana, because of his most exemplary
moral background and "unblemished record").
73. Id. at 400.
74. 286 N.Y.S. 2d 396 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967).
75. Id. at 399.
76. Id. at 400.
77. When New York's Criminal Procedure Law superseded the Code of
Criminal Procedure, section 671 was renumbered as section 210.40. See
generally John F. Wirenius, A Model of Discretion: New York's "Interests of
Justice" Dismissal Statute, 58 ALB. L. REV. 175 (1994).
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nolle prosequi.7 ' The writ of nolle prosequi, however, was
not originally used to permit prosecutors to dismiss indict-
ments in the furtherance of justice, but rather "to dispose of
technically imperfect proceedings instituted by the Crown,
and to put a stop to oppressive, but technically impeccable,
proceedings instituted by private prosecutors."8 Later, in
1881, the New York Legislature adopted Section 671 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure which provided that "the court
may,... of its own motion,... and in furtherance of justice,
order an action, after indictment, to be dismissed.""° In so
doing, the legislature removed the power to dismiss from
the district attorney and vested it in the courts, thus
expanding considerably the traditional uses of the common
law nolle prosequi.81 Seen from an historical point of view,
then, the writ appears to have been lodged solely in the
hands of the prosecutor; expansion of that common law doc-
trine to give courts a role would seem to require statutory
authority.
82
De minimis or "interests of justice" statutes reflect a
legislative will to recognize judicial authority to oversee
executive prosecutorial discretion-one example of a
checks-and-balances framework with which to achieve
ultimate justice. Each branch of the government has a role
in achieving justice. The legislature writes the law. The
prosecutor enforces the law. The judiciary is the final
arbiter as to whether the law has been followed. One
threshold question presented in determining whether a de
minimis analysis can apply even in jurisdictions in which
de minimis or "interests of justice" statutes have not been
enacted is whether judicial review over the prosecutor's
determination to pursue a conviction is appropriate in our
three-branch governmental system. The prosecutor is sup-
posed to examine the factors recognized in the de minimis
and "interests of justice" statutes and case law. He or she is
78. See id. at 176-78.
79. Id. at 178 (quoting Nolle Prosequi, 1958 CRM. L. REV. 573, 577).
80. Id. (quoting N.Y. CODE OF CRIM. PROo. § 671 (Weed, Parsons & Co.
1881)).
81. See id.
82. See Commonwealth v. Kindness, 371 A.2d 1346, 1349 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1977) ("The authorities are virtually unanimous that the historical power to 'nol
pros' belonged at common law solely to the Attorney General and remains an
exclusive prosecutorial power in the absence of a state constitutional or
statutory provision to the contrary").
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charged with the duty to consider the spirit as well as the
letter of the law and to decline to pursue convictions in
some situations when the conduct of the potential defen-
dant technically falls within the purview of a criminal
statute.83 Generally speaking, however, the prosecutor has
been left with unfettered discretion in determiningwhether
justice would be served by pursuing a prosecution. At least
in the absence of a statute or court rule authorized by
statute, allowing judicial review of a decision to prosecute
or review under the common law or even constitutional
precepts is narrowly proscribed, if not prohibited.85
83. The Supreme Court has stated:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall
win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar
and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which
is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1934).
84. See, e.g., Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
(Burger, J.). "It follows, as an incident of the constitutional separation of
powers, that the courts are not to interfere with the free exercise of the
discretionary power of the attorneys of the United States in their control over
criminal prosecutions.". Id. at 481 (citing United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167,
171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965)).
85. Judicial review of decisions to prosecute has been allowed only when
suspect classification-e.g., race or religion-is involved. See United States v.
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996). This exception to the general rule, at first
blush, conjures up questions as to whether "culture" would fall into the
exception; the connection between "race," "religion," and "culture" is obvious.
See also Luther Wright, Jr., Who's Black, Who's White, and Who Cares:
Reconceptualizing the United States's Definition of Race and Racial
Classifications, 48 VAND. L. REv. 513, 537 (1995) (suggesting that EEOC
guidelines use ancestry to define white, black, and Asian/Pacific Islander
classifications while using culture or national origin, regardless of ancestry, for
Hispanic Classifications); Roy L. Brooks, Race as an Under-inclusive and Over-
inclusive Concept, 1 AFR.-AM. L. & PoLy REP. 9, 9-10, 12 (1994) (discussing how
race can be defined in phenotypical terms or, for civil rights purposes, based on
"cultural oppression or alienation").
Even if culture were treated similarly to race for the purpose of identifying the
parameters of a selective prosecution defense, the exception would not provide
assistance to those seeking to advance a cultural defense to criminal
prosecution. The suspect class exception to complete prosecutorial discretion is
applied to ensure that prosecutors do not discriminate against minorities-that
they treat minority defendants as equal to the general populace. The concern is
that the prosecutor will choose to pursue a minority defendant for a crime that
he or she would not prosecute were the defendant white. See Armstrong, 517
U.S. at 465 (to prove a selective prosecution case, the defendant must show that
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Conversely, once the decision to prosecute has been made
and charges filed, judicial oversight commences. Logically,
at this point, the court's power to dismiss a prosecution
would increase.8 Perhaps for this reason, among others,
courts have been careful to construe statutes that remove or
limit judicial power over imposition of punishment in a way
that retains the courts' ability to recognize fundamental
principles of fairness. 7 For example, courts recognize that
the legislature can-within the constitutional constraints
against cruel and unusual punishment-circumscribe their
authority in the area of sentencing.8 Judges can, however,
construe and have construed penalty statutes to leave them
discretion when individual circumstances warrant.89
Judicial control of prosecutions is not limited to the
punishment stage. The judicial power of statutory inter-
similarly situated persons of another race were not prosecuted). In contrast, a
cultural defense does not seek to prevent discrimination in the ordinary sense.
Rather, such a defense seeks to have the minority treated differently from the
majority-to have the prosecutor forego prosecution when the average
defendant would be prosecuted. For this reason, those espousing a cultural
defense cannot look toward conventional anti-discrimination jurisprudence as
support their cause.
Looking to affirmative action precedent for analogies provides no support for a
cultural defense for similar reasons. Although affirmative action does, on one
level, seek to treat minorities differently from the majority in a positive way by
providing benefits unavailable to the equivalent non-minority member, such
action is permitted in order to compensate for past discrimination. See Bush v.
Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277,
286 (1986). Again, the focus is on leveling the playing field, not allowing for
different fields for those with different backgrounds.
86. See People v. Tenorio, 473 P.2d 993, 996 (Cal. 1970) (stating, '"When the
decision to prosecute has been made, the process which leads to acquittal or to
sentencing is fundamentally judicial in nature.").
87. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 94 (1996) (describing the federal
courts' ability to depart from sentencing guidelines); People v. The Superior
Court of San Diego County, 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996) (holding that California's
"three-strike" law did not abrogate the state's "interests of justice" statute, so
that courts retained their discretion to dismiss a prior felony conviction when
imposing sentence). But see Riggs v. California, 119 S. Ct. 890 (1999)
(recognizing that the denied petition for certiorari raised a serious question
about the application of California's "three-strikes" law to petty offenses).
88. See, e.g., Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P. 2d 617 (Cal. 1970).
89. See, e.g., Koon, 518 U.S. at 113 ("It has been uniform and constant in the
federal judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to consider every convicted
person as an individual and every case as a unique study in the human failings
that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the punishment to
ensue. We do not understand it to have been the congressional purpose to
withdraw all sentencing discretion from the United States District Judge.").
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pretation can result not merely in tempered sentences, but
also in outright dismissals. Courts can reject convictions,
even if the offense technically falls within the elements of
the crime under the rules of statutory construction
militating against absurd results, ° and in favor of common
sense.9 ' These rules, if broadly and aggressively applied,
could parallel results from application of a de minimis
statute.92 The court in Kargar, for example, concluded that
the gross sexual assault statute, whatever its technical
language, was not intended to criminalize non-sexual
conduct. Kargar's conduct was then deemed non-sexual by
virtue of his cultural background (as well as by other fac-
tors, such as the nature of the conduct itself). In a Hawaiian
case, that state's Supreme Court recognized a similar limi-
tation on a sex offense statute, relying not on the state's de
minimis statute, but a common sense interpretation of the
law.93 The Supreme Court of Hawaii limited a statute crim-
inalizing "any intrusion or penetration, however slight, of
any part of a person's body, or of any object, into the genital
opening of another person" to prohibiting only "coitus in the
ordinary sense and those intrusions or penetrations of
another person's body that are considered 'inherently and
essentially evil."'94 The court found that it could so limit the
construction of the statute because a "literal application" of
the statute "would encompass, as defendant fears, some
innocent acts," and "we are not bound to accept such con-
sequences."
95
In sum, use of a de minimis analysis, whether based on
a statute or common law rules against absurd results,
provides one avenue to channel the cultural defense into a
viable legal argument. One problem with a de minimis
90. See 2A NoRMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST. § 46.07 (5th ed.
1992).
91. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL
LAW § 22(d), at 109 (1986).
92. One purpose of the de minimis statute is to avoid absurdity and to apply
a rule of reason. See State v. Sorge, 591 A.2d 1382, 1385 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1991); Model Penal Code §2.12, cmt. at 404. The Comment accompanying
the Model Penal Code's adoption of the de minimis statute expressly states that
the statute could be considered as "an application of Blackstone's Tenth Rule,
that a statute should not be interpreted to produce a ludicrous result." Id. §2.12,
cmt. at 404 n.18 (citing 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *91).
93. See State v. Torres, 660 P.2d 522, 527 (Haw. 1983).
94. Id. at 525-26.
95. Id. at 526.
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approach as the exclusive avenue to treat cultural defenses,
however, is its lack of regularity. By definition, a de min-
imis statute is a catchall, necessarily requiring flexibility
and a certain ambiguity. The factors recognized as relevant
to a de minimis analysis are broad, not necessarily
conclusive, and can be weighed by different judges in dif-
ferent ways. One judge's proper exercise of discretion is
another judge's impermissible arbitrary act.96 If a discre-
tionary approach were sufficient, there would be no reason
to review the prosecutor's exercise of discretion in the first
place, nor would there have been any impetus to create
sentencing guidelines. Hence, the next relevant question is
whether any meat can be put on the bones of a de minimis
approach; that is, can any substantive limits or guidance be
injected into a catchall avenue for relief? If so, how does
culture fit into these substantive rules?
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING
CONSIDERATION OF CULTURAL FACTORS
On appeal, in addition to reliance on the de minimis
statute, Kargar also claimed that his conviction violated his
constitutional rights to due process, freedom of religion,
parental autonomy, and privacy.97 These alternative ave-
nues for application of a cultural defense provide further
guidance regarding the role culture should play in deter-
mining criminal guilt.
A. Due Process
The Selden quotation at the beginning of this article,
stating that ignorance of the law is no excuse or defense,98 is
a black-letter principle of law cited time and again.
96. Some jurisdictions have altered the Model Penal Code's "shall dismiss"
to the more permissive "may dismiss," as a way of granting the court broader
discretion. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-236 (1996); ME. REv. STAT. tit. 17-A § 12
(West 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 2-11 (West 1997).
97. Given its decision to reverse the conviction on the basis of the de
minimis statute, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court did not address Kargar's
constitutional arguments.
98. JOHN SELDEN, TABLE TALK 65 (1689) (changing original to use modem
spelling).
99. See, e.g., Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991) ("The general
rule that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal
prosecution is deeply rooted in the American legal system.").
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Equally important, however, are the words that follow the
oft-cited quote: "Ignorance of the law excuses no man; not
that all men know the law, but because 'tis an excuse every
man will plead, and no man can tell how to refute him." 0
Hence, ignorance of the law was originally rejected as a
defense not because it is equitable or just not to consider
this factor, but because of the practical difficulty of its
application. Thus, although intent is not always an element
in a criminal statute, the requirement of a mens rea
remains "the rule of, rather than the exception to the
principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.
"1 °l
In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court has sug-
gested or held that, in some circumstances, ignorance of the
law or lack of intent 2 must be a defense in order to avoid
violation of the Due Process Clause. °" This body of law has
been summarized as follows:
[W]here a criminal statute prohibits and punishes seemingly
innocent or innocuous conduct that does not in itself furnish
grounds to allow the presumption that defendant knew his actions
100. SELDEN, supra note 98, at 65 (emphasis added).
101. United States v. Gypsum, 438 U.S. 422, 436 (1978); Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951); see also Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea
Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in the Criminal Law Past and
Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635, 636 (1993) (citations omitted) (stating, "By the
time of Coke, the maxim 'actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea' (an act does not
make one guilty unless his mind is guilty) had become well ingrained in the
common law, and it remains a central precept of Anglo-American criminal law
today.").
102. There are different types of intent, e.g., general and specific, and
different strata of mens rea. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 422
n.5 (1985). For the purposes of this analysis, the focus is on knowledge of
unlawfulness.
103. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 249-58 (1952)
(construing a statute without a mens rea element to include such an element
because of the legal tradition of requiring intent for serious crimes); Lambert v.
California, 355 U.S. 225, 227 (1957) (holding that a municipal ordinance
making it a crime to be present in Los Angeles without registering with the
police violated the Due Process Clause when the defendant had no knowledge of
his duty to register); United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 608 (1971)
(identifying two ends of a spectrum - public welfare laws that need no mens
rea, and the passive lack of registration in Lambert that requires knowledge of
unlawfulness). More recently, without invoking the Due Process Clause, the
Supreme Court has continued to construe criminal statutes to include intent
elements based on the longstanding common law principle favoring inclusion of
a mens rea. See, e.g., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994); Ratzlaf v.
United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419
(1985).
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must be wrongful, conviction without some other, extraneous proof
of blameworthiness or culpable mental state is forbidden by the
Due Process Clause.
0 4
In contrast, if the act is not innocuous on its face, the
State can criminalize the conduct absent intent if the
State's purpose is to protect public health and safety and if
there was no common law background to the crime that
included an intent element.'5 Public health and safety
offenses that dispense with a mens rea requirement are
usually not positive aggressions or invasions, which the
common law dealt with most often, but are rather in the
nature of neglect. °6 Additionally, the penalties under such
public welfare-neglect laws "commonly are relatively small"
and involve no "grave damage to an offender's repu-
tation.""7 Conversely, if the penalty is severe and the crim-
inal nature of the conduct is not evident on its face, the
statute must have an intent element or it will violate the
Due Process Clause. For example, in Lambert v.
California,'° the Court struck down a section of the Los
Angeles Municipal Code that made it a criminal offense for
a person convicted of an offense punishable as a felony in
California to be present in Los Angeles without registering
with the police. Such criminalization of otherwise passive
activity, the Court held, violated the Due Process Clause.0 9
What does this body of law teach us about the role of
culture as a defense to criminal conviction? In many ways,
these due process requirements echo the de minimis
analysis. Lack of intent or knowledge of criminality, for
example, is required. The severity of the punishment is also
a factor."'
One relevant question to ask when applying a due
process analysis is what standard is applied to determine
104. Stanley v. Turner, 6 F.3d 399, 404 (6th Cir. 1993).
105. See id.
106. See Morrisette, 342 U.S. at 255-56.
107. Id. See also Staples, 511 U.S. at 616 ("Historically, the penalty imposed
under a statute has been a significant consideration in determining whether the
statute should be construed as dispensing with mens rea").
108. 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
109. See id. at 227.
110. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 616 (1994) (emph-asizing
the harsh penalties attaching to violations of the statute at issue as a
"significant consideration in determining whether the statute should be
construed as dispensing with mens rea").
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whether the defendant acted reasonably-for example,
whether he or she "should have" known that the conduct
was illegal. The Due Process Clause is implicated when
harsh penalties are attached to certain acts, absent a mens
rea element, because the defendant has been given
inadequate notice of the wrongfulness of his or her
behavior."' In The Common Law, Oliver Wendell Holmes
wrote: "[A] law which punished conduct which would not be
blameworthy in the average member of the community
would be too severe for that community to bear.""' The
basic question raised when analyzing this concept in a
cultural defense context is how to define the defendant's
community. Similarly, the Supreme Court has noted that
knowledge of the law becomes an element of the crime in
situations-such as certain tax violations-when the law is
so complex that it is "difficult for the average citizen to
know and comprehend" his or her duties."' Again, how do
we define the "average citizen"? If the court looks only at
Anglo-American tradition, that is, whether intent was an
element in the common law, or if the court applies an
objective "should have known" standard in the context of a
person educated in Western traditions, then the impact of
culture is minimized or, more correctly, the Anglo-American
culture is imposed on others.
With no clear answer to this "should have known"
conundrum, other principles may prove useful in deter-mining when culture should be considered. The Supreme
Court's reference to positive aggressions or invasions, for
example, suggests that a violent act is more likely not to be
excused on the basis of cultural differences.14 Applying this
standard, a cultural defense raised by a Hmong man who
had engaged in "marriage by capture""' would be unsuc-
111. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957); see also Liparota v.
United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426-27 (1985) (holding that a food stamp law
required a mens rea element in part because of the application of the principle
that criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of leniency; application of
such a rule "ensures that criminal statutes will provide fair warning concerning
conduct rendered illegal").
112. OLIVER WENDELL HoLMEs, THE COMMON LAw 50 (1881).
113. Cheek v. United States 498 U.S. 192, 199-200 (1991).
114. See State of New Jersey v. Bazin, 912 F. Supp. 106, 115 (D.N.J. 1995)
("[D]irect intentional physical attack upon another... should not be classified
as trivial... even under an expansive view of the scope of the de minimis
statute" (quoting State v. Downey, 576 A.2d 945 (N.J. Super. Law Div. 1988))).
115. In marriage by capture, a Hmong man engages in a courting ritual that
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cessful because he commits the violent act of rape. Under
existing legal standards, however, the Hmong man will not
be convicted if he can establish that he believed that the
woman engaged in sexual intercourse with him voluntarily
because, in the United States, consent is a defense to rape.
He might argue, for example, that, to a Hmong man, a
Hmong woman's verbal protests would demonstrate consent
even though, to a Westerner, such actions would clearly
signal resistance. Because the issue of consent is subjective
under Western tradition, examined from the point of view of
the individual defendant,"' existing Anglo-American law
includes taking his prospective wife into his family home and keeping her there
for three days to consummate the marriage. See Deirdre Evans-Pritchard and
Alison Dundes Renteln, The Interpretation and Distortion of Culture: A Hmong
"Marriage by Capture" Case in Fresno, California, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY
L.J. 1, 8 (1995) [hereinafter Marriage by Capture]. In Hmong language,
"marriage by capture" or "marriage by abduction" is called "zij poj niam"; such
marriages are also known as "bride-theft" or "tshoob zij." See id. at 14. Another
common marriage practice among the Hmong, called "marriage by elopement,"
occurs when a woman goes willingly with a man. See id. While being held
captive, the woman is supposed to protest that she is not ready for sex in order
to prove her virtue. Sometimes a Hmong woman will file rape charges against
the man following such an episode, claiming her protests were genuine and not
part of a courting ritual. See id.
116. See generally John H. Biebel, I Thought She Said Yes: Sexual Assault
in England and America, 19 SUFFOLK TRANSNATL L. REv. 153, 155 (1995)
(discussing English and American courts' willingness to make "mistake of
consent" defenses available to defendants in rape trials). In Comment, Forcible
and Statutory Rape: An Exploration of the Operation and Objectives of the
Consent Standard, 62 YALE L. J. 55, 74 (1952), cited approvingly in MODEL
PENAL CODE § 213.1 commentary at 302-03 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1980), the author points out that reliance solely on a woman's
subjective opposition to his sexual act "conflict[s] with a vital community policy
that allows individuals to rely, as a guide to their own conduct, on the behavior
of others." Because "[me any areas of the law permit reliance upon the apparent
meaning of another's words or actions .... where a woman demon-strates overt
signs of acquiescence to sexual advances, consummation of the act should not
jeopardize the man because of her unexpressed reservation of consent." Id. In
such instances, as with the Hmong man who believes a woman's overt
opposition to his sexual advances is part of a courting ritual actually indicating
her consent, the "man is ignorant of the controlling fact which would brand his
act rape-the woman's attitude of opposition." See id. Thus, states the author,
"the policy of protecting reliance on the behavior of others should prevail over
the demand for protection of the woman's right to withhold consent." Id. See
also Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813, 831 (1991) (asserting
that the consent standard makes successful prosecution of acquaintance rape
cases nearly impossible). But see Katharine K. Baker, Once a Rapist?
Motivational Evidence and Relevancy in Rape Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 563, 576
(1997) ("Individual state inter-pretations of critical terms, like force and
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allows a violent defendant to avoid penalty based on his
cultural background; the defendant's cultural background
led him to believe that consent existed when, in fact, it did
not. In this particular situation, therefore, the debate is not
whether Anglo-American principles should be expanded to
allow for cultural differences. Rather, the question is
whether these existing principles should be changed and
limited to protect victims of violent conduct. For example, in
the case of People v. Moua," twenty-three-year-old Kong
Moua claimed he was following traditional Hmong mar-
riage practices when he engaged in sexual intercourse with
Seng Xiong, then nineteen." Although both were born in
Laos and moved to the United States as teenagers, Seng
apparently had rejected the tradition of marriage by
capture and believed that Kong had raped her."9 At trial,
Kong did not argue that he was unfamiliar with American
law as an excuse or that he did not know that rape and
kidnapping were crimes. What he did claim was that he
believed he was marrying Seng according to Hmong
tradition when he engaged in sexual intercourse with her.
19
Thus, Kong did not claim ignorance of the law, but rather, a
reasonable mistake of fact as to whether Seng had
consented to the sexual intercourse. 2'
Some feminist legal scholars point out the dangers to
women and children of misusing patriarchal tradition in an
attempt to excuse immigrant defendants from legal
responsibility.2 ' Although cultural evidence has been used
at times to reduce sentences for immigrant women who
have committed crimes, most often it has been used by
consent, vary widely, and the defendant's state of mind can be, but is not
always, critical.").
117. No. 315972-0 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 17, 1985).
118. Marriage by Capture, supra note 115, at 9.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 22.
121. See id. at 23. Recognizing a mistake of fact as to consent would
establish that Kong did not have the necessary intent, or mens rea, to commit
the crime of rape. The public defender in the case did not, however, invoke a
mistake of fact defense; Kong accepted a plea bargain included in which culture
was considered as a mitigating factor during sentencing. See id. at 25-27. See
generally Rosanna Cavallaro, A Big Mistake: Eroding the Defense of Mistake of
Fact About Consent in Rape, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 815 (1996)
(exploring the transformation of the mistake of fact defense into a new rule of
"equivocality").
122. See, e.g., law review articles cited supra note 2.
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immigrant men, particularly Asians, who abuse, rape, or
kill immigrant women and children.23 Courts are increas-
ingly being asked to consider cultural factors as a defense
or mitigating circumstance in cases involving domestic
violence and child abuse, including the traditional practice
of female circumcision, or female genital mutilation.24
Examples of cultural evidence used in attempts to reduce
charges or sentences are multiplying.2 ' The debate
involving the cultural defense thus becomes part of a larger
debate about whether there is or should be "a unifying
American culture that guides our institutions, including the
justice system, or whether the United States is and should
be a culturally pluralistic nation in all respects, including in
the law."'26 Permitting sensitivity to a defendant's culture in
applying laws to that individual demonstrates respect for
multiculturalism and furthers the policy of providing
individualized justice-and individualism, in turn, is an
Anglo-American value. Advancing the causes of multi-
culturalism and individualized justice, however, may result
in denying adequate protection to victims, often women and
children, because their assailants often go free or serve
relatively short sentences.'27 Thus, acceptance of the
123. See Restoring Hope or Tolerating Abuse?, supra note 2, at 277-78.
124. Female genital mutilation is an operation currently being performed on
young girls that involves the "incision and usually removal of part or all of the
female external genitalia, which includes the clitoris, the clitoral prepuce, the
labia majora and the labia minora." Lori Ann Larson, Female Genital
Mutilation in the United States: Child Abuse or Constitutional Freedom?, 17
WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 237, 238 (1996).
125. They include the following: a Houston insurance salesman, "accused of
child abuse for hitting his misbehaving nephew and then putting pepper in the
boy's abrasions" was sentenced to probation after arguing that this practice is
an acceptable form of discipline in his native Nigeria; a Mexican woman from
Los Angeles was ordered to seek counseling after being accused of child abuse
for beating her 15-year-old son with a wooden spoon and biting him as
punishment for taking money from her purse; in San Francisco and Los
Angeles, two young Japanese mothers were allowed to plead guilty to
manslaughter instead of standing trial for murder after killing their children
because experts asserted that oyako-shinju, or parent-child suicide, is
frequently prac-ticed in Japan by wives humiliated by their husbands'
infidelity; a Chinese immigrant, convicted of manslaughter for beating his wife
to death with a hammer after she allegedly admitted to having an affair, was
given five year's probation because the judge accepted the argument that
"traditional Chinese notions about the shame of adultery had propelled him to
violence." When is Cultural Difference a Legal Defense?, supra note 4, at Al.
126. Coleman, supra note 1, at 1094.
127. See id. at 1095.
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cultural defense, which promotes the progressive cause of
multiculturalism and the traditional protection of the
individual, runs the risk of deterring another fundamental
goal, the expansion of legal protections for some of the least
powerful members of American society, women and
children, and their own rights as individuals to be free from
harm.
12 8
Some commentators posit that the cultural defense
rests on the false assumption that American law is "without
a culture," thus ignoring the "fluid and shifting nature of
American identity."2 ' This raises the ultimate difficult issue
of defining culture in the first place, either within the
dominant American society or in any of the immigrant com-
munities present in this country. Because differently
situated people within a community experience "culture"
differently, the admission of cultural evidence to exculpate
one member of that community may result in prejudicing
and further victimizing another member of the same com-
munity through the application of social norms that she
believed no longer applied to her in this country. One
commentator concludes that the way to reconcile the inter-
ests of multiculturalism and victims' rights is to use the
cultural defense only when it serves the goal of antisub-
ordination.30 Under this view, by implication the defense
would only be available to 
female defendants.
t
A similar debate has occurred in the international
arena where the concept of universal human rights is pitted
128. See id.
129. See, e.g., Leti Volpp, (Mis)identifying Culture: Asian Women and the
"Cultural Defense," 17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 61-62 (1994).
130. See id. at 63 ("[Tlhe value of antisubordination should be factored into
the decision of whether or not to support use of the defense and that a
commitment to antisubordination must entail a simultaneous recognition of
material and descriptive oppression based on factors such as race, gender,
immigrant status and national origin.").
131. Permitting women to assert cultural defenses may result in the
perpetuation of negative stereotypes, e.g., Latina women as passive participants
in crimes perpetrated by their husbands or male partners. See Kristen L.
Holmquist, Cultural Defense or False Stereotype? What Happens When Latina
Defendants Collide with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 12 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 45, 65 (1997). Women may be forced to either accept "harsh
statutorily mandated sentences, or... embrace stereotype and play to a court's
sympathy by presenting themselves as pawns of their husbands, naive and
lacking in self-determination. By choosing the latter they shape themselves
according to someone else's definition and mold their destinies, and the
destinies of others like them, according to someone else's plan." Id.
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against local cultural standards. The movement for
international women's rights seeks to put pressure on
countries to abandon customs and traditions that have
resulted in the subjugation of women and violence toward
women and children. To the extent that the adoption of the
cultural defense is consistent with these goals, the conflict
between multiculturalism and the protection of victims'
rights may be minimized; to the extent that the adoption of
the cultural defense further institutionalizes the
subjugation of women and violence toward women and
children, that conflict appears to defy resolution.
In the context of existing United States due process
jurisprudence, a defendant would not appear to be able to
invoke this constitutional protection successfully when
charged with a violent crime unless he or she invoked some
other common law or statutory defense, such as consent.
Not only would Anglo-American common law normally
condemn such behavior, but typically, lack of a mens rea is
allowed only when the criminalized conduct is passive, as
opposed to active, 2 or endangers safety and health.133
Under the Due Process Clause, the injustice caused to the
unknowing defendant can be weighed against the damage
done to the victim.' The maxim that ignorance of the law is
no excuse arose in the first instance to protect the
community.'35 If lawmakers can require persons dealing
with food, drugs, or dangerous instrumentalities to apprise
themselves of the law or be subject to criminal penalties,
requiring an actor within a jurisdiction to know that his or
her acts are similarly criminal may impose no undue
132. See Stepniewski v. Gagnon, 732 F.2d 567, 571 (7th Cir. 1984).
133. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672 (1975); United States v.
Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971).
134. See United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 253-54 (1922) (upholding a
narcotics law: "Congress weighed the possible injustice of subjecting an
innocent seller to a penalty against the evil of exposing innocent purchasers to
danger from the drug, and concluded that the latter was the result preferably to
be avoided.").
135. See United States v. Mancuso, 420 F.2d 556, 559 n.5 (2d Cir. 1970)
(stating, "Common law cases generally applied the maxim ignorantia legis
neminem excusat ('ignorance of the law excuses no one') when mistake or
ignorance of the existence of a criminal prohibition was urged. The sound
reasoning behind such a conclusion was that the criminal law expressed general
communal moral standards, and ignorance of their existence reflected in any
case either recklessness or dangerousness to the community") (citing Jerome
Hall, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 33 IND. L.J. 1 (1957)).
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burden on the actor, at least when the action is not passive,
but inflicts violence upon a blameless victim.
B. Religion, Parental Control, and Privacy
Another currently existing basis for a cultural defense
can be found in the First Amendment 36  and its"penumbra."'37  Importantly, the argument that a
defendant's conduct should not be deemed criminally wrong
because of the protections bestowed or recognized in the
Constitution for religious beliefs, parental rights, and
privacy, differs from the values protected under the Due
Process Clause or the de minimis analysis in one crucial
respect: knowledge that one's conduct violates the law is not
relevant to the inquiry.
1. Religion To the extent that "culture" equals"religion," it has been protected under the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment and, for a time, its
statutory counterpart, the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993.138 Until struck down by the Supreme Court in
City of Boerne v. Flores,39 the Religious Freedom Restor-
ation Act required strict scrutiny to be applied to a law
neutral on its face if it adversely impacted religious activ-
ity.' Even in the absence of this statute, strict scrutiny is
applied to laws neutral as to religion when those laws
implicate parental rights. 4' Under the strict scrutiny stan-
dard, a law is invalid as applied "unless it is justified by a
compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that
interest."' Hence, the relevant questions in analyzing the
applicability of this standard in the context of a cultural
defense include the following: (1) when is a "culture" a
136. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
137. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) ("[T]he First
Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental
intrusion.").
138. The Act was codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb4 (Supp. 1994).
139. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a), (b).
141. See Employment Div. Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 881 (1990) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) and Pierce
v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)).
142. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 533 (1993) (upholding church's challenge to city ordinances dealing with
ritual slaughter of animals).
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"religion" for the purposes of the Free Exercise Clause; and
(2) what sort of "compelling interest" permits crimin-
alization of religious activity? Little has been written about
when and whether a "culture" will be viewed as a "religion"
for the purposes of the Free Exercise Clause; the Supreme
Court has simply required that Free Exercise claims "be
rooted in religious belief.",4 Emphasizing the necessity of
basing a Free Exercise claim on religion, the Court ex-
plained that a "subjective evaluation and rejection of the
contemporary secular values accepted by the majority,
much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his time and
isolated himself at Walden Pond, ... would not rest on a
religious basis"; rather, these beliefs would be
"philosophical and personal rather than religious" and, as
such, would "not rise to the demands of the Religion
Clauses."1" Thus, cases decided under the Free Exercise
Clause have dealt with persons seeking to commit acts in
the name of their religion15 or to refrain from complying
with some governmental requirement due to their religious
beliefs. "6
Some of these cases, however, have distinctly cultural
overtones. In Frank v. Alaska,17 for example, the Alaska
Supreme Court held that the practice of killing moose, out
of season, to serve at a funeral was based on the sincerely
held religious tenets of a Central Alaskan Athabscan man
and, thus, was protected under the Free Exercise Clause.'
The strongly worded dissent, however, pointed out that it
was "merely desirable" to serve fresh moose meat at fun-
erals, and that "[u]nless the use of fresh moose meat rises to
the level of a cardinal religious principle, unless it is central
to a religious observance, it cannot qualify as a practice
protected" by the Free Exercise Clause."' The majority,
nevertheless, granted an exemption for Athabascan people
from a state statute prohibiting unlawful transportation of
143. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
144. Id. at 216.
145. See, e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990) (discussing American Indians seeking the right to perform
peyote rituals).
146. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205 (discussing Amish seeking exemption
from state law compelling their children to attend formal high school to age 16).
147. 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979).
148. See id. at 1071-72.
149. Id. at 1076 (Connor, J., dissenting).
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game illegally taken based on the Free Exercise Clause.
150
Thus, the principle applied in Frank could apply to cultural
practices of immigrants that were arguably related to their
religious beliefs, even if the relationship is attenuated.
Similarly, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 5 the Supreme Court
noted the inseparability of the Amish religion and "way of
life" in general, stating that "the Old Order Amish religion
pervades and determines the entire mode of life of its
adherents."52 It is difficult to see where the Amish religion
and culture divide, for constitutional purposes, under such
a perspective.' In the end, what is "religious" is basically
what the individual says it is, as long as some theistic
concept is linked to that belief or practice.' If the belief is
sincere and somehow relates to the concept of a deity or
deities, that belief would warrant protection under the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.'55
When the conduct in question does constitute a reli-
gious rather than a purely cultural practice, triggering the
strict scrutiny standard, the next question is what sort of
governmental interest is deemed sufficiently compelling to
overcome the protection of the Free Exercise Clause. As in
the due process analysis, the "malum in se" versus "malum
prohibitum" nature of the conduct criminalized seems
relevant. In Kargar, for example, the prevention of actual
child sex abuse would undoubtedly be viewed as a
150. See id. at 1075.
151. 406 U.S. at 210.
152. Id.
153. See also Carol M. Messito, Regulating Rites: Legal Responses to Female
Genital Mutilation in the West, 16 IN PUBLIC INTEREST 33, 55-59 (1997)
(discussing the current debate as to whether female genital mutilation is a
cultural or religious phenomenon).
154. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-6, at 1181
(2d. ed. 1988) ("'Religion' must be defined from the believer's perspective.").
155. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981). "The
determination of what is a 'religious' belief or practice is more often than not a
difficult and delicate task.... The resolution of that question is not to turn
upon a judicial perception of the particular belief or practice in question;
religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent or comprehensible to
others in order to merit First Amendment protection." Id. See also United
States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (defining religion in terms of what it is
not, i.e., not a political, social, or philosophical belief); id. at 178-79, (Douglas,
J., concurring) (broadening the term "Supreme Being" to include the religious
belief systems that do not subscribe to the existence of God, such as Hinduism,
Buddhism, and others"). Id. at 188-89.
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compelling interest.5 ' The Maine court accepted Kargar's
defense because he successfully argued that his conduct
was in fact "non-sexual." Under such circumstances, no
compelling State interest protected in the gross sexual
assault statute was undermined by his conduct. Between
these two ends of the spectrum-child abuse and non-
sexual conduct-the point where State intrusion into
religious acts is supported by a compelling interest blurs.
Traditionally, lines have been drawn distinguishing
religious beliefs from religious practices. Although beliefs
are sacrosanct, the State can curb practices when the free-
dom to participate in them is outweighed by societal
interests. In Reynolds v. United States,5' for example, the
Supreme Court upheld a federal statute defining and
providing for the punishment of polygamy even though the
defendant offered evidence to show that polygamous
marriage was a part of his religion.'58 In holding that
polygamy would be illegal both for those who make poly-
gamy a part of their religious belief and those who do not,
the Court relied on the distinction between religious belief
and religious practices.'59 Describing the statute as "within
the legislative power of Congress," the Court questioned
whether one could seriously contend that the civil govern-
ment would not be able to outlaw human sacrifices claimed
to be "a necessary part of religious worship" or the practice
of wives who "religiously believed it was [their] duty to burn
[themselves] upon the funeral pile of [their dead hus-
bands]."'6
The Reynolds decision can be criticized as a product of
anti-Mormon sentiment, unacceptable within current
parameters of judicial analysis. In upholding the anti-
polygamy law, for example, the Supreme Court noted that
"[plolygamy has always been odious among the northern
and western nations of Europe, and, until the establish-
ment of the Mormon Church, was almost exclusively a
156. See United States v. Freeman, 808 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1987) (citing
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747) (1982)) (citing the Ferber Court's recognition
that "states [have] compelling interest in protecting children from sexual
abuse").
157. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
158. See id. at 166-67.
159. See id. at 166.
160. Id.
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feature of the life of Asiatic and of African people."16' Such a
consideration of traditional Western norms as a relevant
touchstone for constitutional acceptability would seem
untenable today.6 ' Yet, Reynolds remains good law.'63 The
Court's references in Reynolds to immolation and other
bodily harm retain resonance today. Although current
thought might question equating the harm of plural
marriage with burning widows, one point would seem to
retain force and engender consensus: the State still has a
compelling interest in prohibiting immolation, if not plural
marriage, because of the practice's physical destruction. In
sum, consistent with the due process analysis, violence
appears to be a serious, if not determinative factor.
Applying the compelling interest standard suggested by the
Reynolds Court, the government could prohibit and crim-
inalize cultural and religious practices that involve violence
or the infliction of bodily harm. Examples of such cultural
161. Id. at 164. This adverse judicial treatment based on a practice or belief
deemed Asian or African, as opposed to coming from Western traditions, was no
aberration. The Chinese, for example, had been described by the Supreme Court
in an earlier case as a "menace to our civilization" because, among other
reasons, they "retained the habits and customs of their own country.... ." Chae
Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 595 (1889). See also Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 717 (1893) (noting that the Chinese, who were "of a
distinct race and religion, remaining strangers in the land, residing apart by
themselves, tenaciously adhering to the customs and usages of their own
country, unfamiliar with our institutions, and apparently incapable of
assimilating with our people, might endanger good order, and be injurious to
the public interests").
162. See Church of the Lukumi v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)
(upholding animal sacrifice practiced as part of the Santeria religion, a fusion of
traditional African and Roman Catholic beliefs and practices). But see Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 473 (1988)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the majority's rejection of a Native
American protest against the Forest Service for paving land sacred to the
claimants "represents yet another stress point in the longstanding conflict
between two disparate cultures - the dominant Western culture ... and that of
Native Americans").
163. See Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1068, cert. denied, 474 U.S.
849 (1985) (holding that termination of police officer for practice of plural
marriage did not violate his right to free exercise of religion). The Potter Court
found that later precedent did not effectively overturn Reynolds; notably, the
Court concluded that the State had a compelling interest in protecting
monogamy because "[m]onogamy... is the bedrock upon which our culture is
built." Id. at 1070. See also Maura I. Strassberg, Distinctions of Form or
Substance: Monogamy, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 75 N.C.L. Rev. 1501
(1997) (explaining why polygamy restrictions can be upheld although gender-
based marriage restrictions should be struck down).
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practices would include marriage by capture (if it entailed
kidnapping and forcible rape), killing adulterous wives,
parent-child suicide, and female genital mutilation. Under
this analysis, the government would not have a sufficiently
compelling interest in criminalizing practices involving
minimal violence or permanent bodily harm like male
circumcision or non-violent, non-harmful offenses like the
conduct at issue in Kargar.
Ultimately, some Western concepts of proper conduct
act at least as a thumb on the scale in this balancing test.'"
For example, although the long-term harm from male
circumcision may be minimal (and may possibly have
health benefits),'" the act, when imposed upon an infant, is
by any definition painful.66 Polygamy, on the other hand,
has no violent overtones. Yet the law allows the violent act
and prohibits the other. One explanation for this anomaly
involves history and tradition. Although polygamy has been
viewed as a threat to "the bedrock upon which our culture is
built,"167 male circumcision has been institutionalized over
time. If the practice had never occurred before today, under
the existing balancing test, a court might well find the act
abusive and constitutionally unprotected. Conversely, re-
cent analyses of marriage by same-sex couples demon-
strate that, again, were courts writing on a clean historical
slate, legal recognition of domestic relationships might be
more expansive."' Using contemporary, mainstream
164. See, e.g., Potter, 760 F.2d at 1068.
165. See Melissa A. Morgan, Female Genital Mutilation: An Issue on the
Doorstep of the American Medical Community, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 93, 98 (1997)
(noting that the medical community is "divided on the health benefits
associated with male circumcision"). Id.
166. See Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The Seattle Compromise: Multicultural
Sensitivity and Americanization, 47 DUKE L.J. 717, 759 (1998) (citing AMERICAN
ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS, CIRCUMCISION: PROS AND CONS, GUIDELINES FOR
PARENTS (1995) (documenting that "[tihe infant experiences pain along with the
surgery")).
167. See Potter, 760 F.2d at 1070.
168. See Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *22 (Hawaii Cir.
Ct. 1996) (holding that Hawaii statute forbidding same-sex marriage was
unconstitutional and in violation of the equal protection clause of article I,
section 5 of the Hawaii Constitution). Justice Powell, who wrote for the Majority
in Bowers v. Hardwick., 478 U.S. 186 (1986), in which the Court declined to
"extend a fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual
sodomy" because such homosexual relationships were not "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition," 478 U.S. at 192 (quoting Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)), later expressed regret for that decision.
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American concepts of blameworthiness in weighing the
compelling nature of the interest behind the criminalization
of the conduct at issue makes sense because the strict
scrutiny test balances the individual's interest in religion
against society's interest,'69 and in America, society's
interests are defined by contemporary, generally accepted
values-the majority view. Hence, although violence may be
one important factor, other factors such as sheer contem-
porary acceptance also have, and logically should have,
some weight in the balancing test.7 '
2. Parental Rights and Privacy. Even if a defendant's
particular cultural act is not deemed a religious practice
protected under the First Amendment, it may still involve
other protected behavior triggering a strict scrutiny
analysis. For example, a parent has a liberty interest in
directing the upbringing and education of his or her chil-
See JOHN C. JEFFERIES, JR., JUSTICE LEwIS F. POWELL, JR. 530 (1994). On
October 18, 1990, while giving the annual James Madison lecture at New York
University Law School, Justice Powell answered a student's question about
Bowers v. Hardwick, indicating that he thought he had "probably made a
mistake in that one." Id. Later, when a reporter called to confirm that remark,
Justice Power stated that "the dissent [in Bowers] had the better of the
arguments." Id..
169. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878).
170. In contrast, sheer historical acceptance, as opposed to contemporary
acceptance, should logically not play a role in the balancing test of societal
interest versus individual rights. What matters is what society thinks now, not
what it thought previously. The Supreme Court, however, appears to give
historical acceptance considerable weight in the due process balancing test. In
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), for example, the Court stated
that it would begin its analysis, as it does "in all due process cases, by
examining our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices." Id. at 710
(citing, inter alia, Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (citations
omitted) (noting the importance of "careful 'respect for the teachings of
history'")). In Glucksberg, while upholding a state statute prohibiting assisted
suicide, the Court noted as an important factor the fact that "the Anglo-
American common law tradition" has punished such activity. Id. at 711. See
also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1986) (citations omitted)
(declining to "extend a fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of
consensual sodomy" because "[piroscriptions against that conduct have ancient
roots" and such conduct is not "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"). But see Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-35 (1996) (noting that laws targeting a particular
group because of societal disapproval must have legitimate State purpose
distinct from mere societal disapproval).
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dren. 7' The State cannot interfere with parental rights
simply because the parent's conduct seems "odd" 7 or
"foreign.""' In another example, 74 the Supreme Court
struck down a law prohibiting the teaching in school of any
language other than English.175 The plaintiff teacher had
taught German to a child in a parochial school maintained
by the Zion Evangelical Lutheran Congregation. 76 The
Nebraska Supreme Court had upheld the law as justified in
order to teach the children of immigrants to assimilate. 77 In
reversing the Nebraska court, the United States Supreme
Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment's protection
against deprivations of liberty includes, "[w]ithout
doubt,... the right of the individual... to marry, establish
a home and bring up children,... according to the dictates
of his own conscience .... ,,17' The rationales of promoting
"civic development" or "American ideals" in immigrants
were not sufficiently compelling tojustify the illegalization
of teaching foreign languages. Thus, the goal of
"Americanization" cannot trump a parent's liberty right to
bring up children as desired; some other overriding interest
is required to supersede a parent's right.8 ' This familial
interest is closely linked to the privacy right recognized by
the Supreme Court in the "penumbra" of the Constitution.
Whatever one believes are the proper parameters, if
any, of these "penumbra" protections, the point for the
purposes of analyzing the place culture has in applying
these constitutional rights is that such familial or privacy
171. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
172. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 223-24 (1972).
173. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 398-99 (1923).
174. See id.
175. See id. at 403.
176. See id. at 396.
177. See id. at 398 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 187 N.W. 100 (Neb. 1922)).
178. Id. at 399.
179. See id. at 401-402.
180. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) ("The private interest
here, that of a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably
warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection");
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("It is cardinal with us that
the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents," and court
decisions "have respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot
enter.").
181. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 516 (1965) (stating that




interests seem likely to be implicated in many cases where
culture is an issue. Logically, the area of sexuality and
family relations in general is the ripest for potential
cultural clashes because it is that aspect of life in which
cultures often vary most significantly. For example, some
social commentators suggest that the Chinese tend to be
more group oriented than Americans, living together under
one roof with many extended family members. 82 In such a
culture, "children are expected to be obedient to their
parents" and respect for elders is considered to be a "basic
virtue."'83 In an "individualistic" culture like the United
States, "children are treated as equals" and "encouraged to
be independent at an early age." 8 To a greater extent than
in the West, some say that women in Japan, Korea, and
other, less developed Asian societies are treated differently
from men both socially and legally.'85 Girls are expected to
work in the labor force only until they are married, at which
time they are expected to work solely in the home. 86 In
some cultures, women may even be treated as chattel."' By
contrast, in Scandinavian countries, a high degree of sexual
equality and sex role fluidity is said to exist. 88 Regarding
sexuality, some say many Latinos feel uncomfortable
discussing the topic, considering such talk to be
disrespectful and taboo. 9 Differences regarding family
values, however, are not only a product of culture or
geography, but also the historical period and people's
individual beliefs. Hence, this area has proven to be a sen-
182. See Laura Nowak D. Dong, Intercultural Differences Between Chinese
and Americans in Business, 60 BuLL. ASSOC. FOR Bus. CoMM. 115, 116 (March 1,
1997).
183. See James H. Davis, F. David Schoorman & Lex Donaldson, Toward a
Stewardship Theory of Management, ACAD. MGmTr. REV., January 1, 1997, at 20.
184. See id.
185. See Francis Fukuyama, Asian Values and the Asian Crisis,
COMMENTARY, Feb. 1, 1998, at 23.
186. See id.
187. See Jennifer Gould, Undiplomatic Behavior: Those Bad-Boy Envoys:
Seduction, Secrecy, Sexual Assault, VILLAGE VOICE, May 20, 1997, at 32
(reporting on sexual harassment by United Nations delegates from foreign
countries).
188. See Frederick R. Lynch, The Diversity Machine (Workplace Diversity),
SOCIETY, July 17, 1997, at 32.
189. See Joseph Hanania, Facing their Fears, the Latino Men's Group is
Helping its Members Modify Risky Sexual Behavior and Reach Out in an Ethnic




sitive battleground for constitutional disputes, whether or
not "culture" is involved.190
In sum, currently applicable analysis of religious, par-
ental, and privacy rights show that (1) sincerity of belief is
important; (2) the more the "belief' is reflected in "acts," the
more subject it is to limitation; (3) violent acts are most
subject to repression; and (4) because the analysis involves
balancing individual rights against societal interests, the
definition of a societal interest can, in some cases, be
crucial. Contemporary majority acceptance can be identified
as the societal interest; some precedent supports past his-
torical majority acceptance as reflecting a societal interest
as well.
IV. RELEVANT COMMON PRINCIPLES
In looking at this existing framework for assertion of a
cultural defense, one point becomes clear: assertion of the
defense is based on the importance we place on the
individual in our society.' The primacy of the individual
can be identified as the moving force behind our political
and legal system. "All men are created equal," perhaps the
most fundamental of our legal rules, incorporates the idea
that each individual is important. 92 This core tenet justifies
our entire political structure. From a philosophical
perspective, the United States was created as a nation-
state, not by historical accident or ethnic proximity, but
because individuals-with rights and consciences-joined
together in voluntary association to form a government to
protect their rights.' Based on this focus on the individual,
190. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (holding that
Georgia statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy does not violate the
fundamental rights of homosexuals); but cf Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996
WL 694235, at *22 (Hawaii Cir. Ct. 1996). See also supra note 167.
191. See Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Deconstructing Homorgeneous] Americans:
The White Ethnic Immigrant Narrative and its Exclusionary Effect, 72 TUL. L.
REV. 1493, 1514 (1998) (describing individualism as a core American belief).
192. See Regents of the Univ. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 326 (1978) (Brennan,
White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("Our Nation was founded on the principle that 'all Men are created equal.");
Phillip R. Trimble, Globalization, International Institutions, and the Erosion of
National Sovereignty and Democracy, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1944, 1953 (1997) ('The
philosophical departure point for discourse about politics and government in the
West is that 'all men are created equal.'").
193. In the preamble to the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, the
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our society imposes personal, not collective responsibility.'94
Due to the value we place on the individual, we believe that
it is better for a hundred guilty defendants to go free than
for one innocent individual to suffer.'95 Based on the same
core value-the recognition of the importance of the
individual-we recognize that "one size fits all" laws can
fail to result in justice in individual situations.' 96 We value
mercy-the conviction that sometimes, based on the
specifics of a situation, it is unfair to apply the general rule
to a particular individual. As the Honorable Charles D.
Breitel stated in his 1960 speech to the Third Dedicatory
Conference on Criminal Justice, if every law enforcement
officer, prosecutor, and court rigorously enforced every law
as it was "precisely and narrowly laid down, the criminal
law would be ordered but intolerable. Living would be a
sterile compliance with soul-killing rules and taboos. By
comparison, a primitive tribal society would seem free,
indeed."'97
The right of the individual forms the very reason for the
existence of each of the constitutional bases of a cultural
defense: the First Amendment, the Due Process Clause, and
other aspects of the Bill of Rights. All of these safeguards
exist to protect the individual against the majority will.'98
drafter, John Adams, wrote: "The body politic is formed by a voluntary
association of individuals; it is a social compact by which the whole people
covenants with each citizen and each citizen with the whole people that all shall
be governed by certain laws for the common good." MASS. CONST. OF 1780,
preamble (reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL
CHARTERS AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 956-57 (Ben: Perly
Poor, compiler, 1877).
194. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 163 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring)
("The doctrine of personal guilt is one of the most fundamental principles of our
jurisprudence. It partakes of the very essence of the concept of freedom and due
process of law."); Daniel J. Steinbock, Interpreting the Refugee Definition, 45
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 733, 792 (1998) ("IT]he use of group membership as a proxy for
guilt is antithetical to the notions of individual responsibility and justice lying
at the heart of... American... law.").
195. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (identifying as "a fundamental value determination of our society
that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free").
196. See, e.g., State of Minnesota v. Kahn, 555 N.W.2d 15, 21 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1996) (Randall, J., concurring) ("All attempts at 'one size fits all' generally
end up snaring the innocent and unwary more than criminals.").
197. Charles D. Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. CI.
L. REV. 427, 427 (1960), quoted in MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.12 cmt. at 403.
198. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm., 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995)
(stating that "[alnonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority" that
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Over time, courts have concluded that the analysis under
each of these protections of minority rights involves a
balancing test." The right of the individual is weighed
against the harm to society that the exercise of the indi-
vidual's rights might cause in that society.00 With this
understanding, a cultural defense is simply one
manifestation of the clash between the individual and
society recognized and treated under our constitutional
framework. Although "culture" may appear to be a new,
"flavor-of-the-month" legal interest, associated with such
contemporary concerns as diversity, pluralism, and political
correctness, it is instead just a newly clothed context in
which the core, individualistic legal principles upon which
our nation was founded are exercised. No new values are
implicated, and existing law has already spent centuries
weighing the proper balance for such values. Indeed, the
recognition of any new cultural defense outside this existing
balancing framework could lead to pernicious results,
undermining our fundamental, core values. We must be
careful to understand that a "cultural" defense involves
respect for the individual-a classic value from the
enlightenment era and the foundation of our nation. We
should not inject a new, collectivistic value system into this
framework for the sake of elevating "cultural" rights above
the rights of any particular individual.
It is evident that existing de minimis statutes, the
common law, and the Constitution already consider the
same interests implicated in any cultural defense. For
example, one factor examined under both a de minimis
analysis and the Due Process Clause is the consequence
"exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of the First Amendment
in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation-and their ideas
from suppression-at the hand of an intolerant society").
199. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 850 (1992) (citing Poe v. Ullman, 357 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting from dismissal on jurisdictional grounds). In his dissent, Justice
Harlan stated, "Due process has not been reduced to any formula.... The best
that can be said is that through the course of this Court's decisions it has
represented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for
the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands
of organized society." Id. at 849-50.
200. Cf. Michigan State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449 (1990) (explaining
Fourth Amendment analysis of constitutionality of sobriety checkpoint as a
balance of the State's interest, the effectiveness of the State action, and the
level of intrusion on the individual's privacy).
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that can be suffered by virtue of a conviction; sometimes, as
the authors of the Model Penal Code observed, a conviction
alone, however lenient the sentence, is too harsh a penalty
to pay."' Another factor relevant to the de minimis analysis,
the Due Process Clause, and the strict scrutiny tests used
where religious, parental or privacy rights are implicated, is
harm. The inclusion of this factor reflects the basic
principles in our jurisprudence that the law punishes acts,
not thoughts, 20 2 and that society needs to balance its
collective interests against individual beliefs.
V. CONCLUSION
Certain minor, but important fine-tuning of existing
statutory law can avoid convictions that violate our
constitutional and common law recognition that culture can
mitigate or absolve guilt in individual circumstances. Most
significantly, adoption of a de minimis-type statute at both
the state and federal level, to supplement prosecutorial
discretion with judicial overview on a case-by-case basis,
appropriately provides a last-chance escape hatch from
injustice in exceptional situations-whether that exception
is created by virtue of the defendant's culture or other
factors. Although adoption of such a statute necessarily
expands judicial discretion, potentially resulting in
disparate treatment of similarly situated defendants (the
disadvantage leading to sentencing guidelines and other
efforts to standardize punishments), such discretion
provides protection of such fundamental values of American
jurisprudence as the primacy of the individual and the
importance of mercy. That some judges may abuse their
discretion does not warrant its elimination. In addition,
other statutes can be changed to reduce the potentially
grave consequences of conviction. One factor identified by
201. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.12 cmt. at 400-401 (quoting ROYAL COMM'N
APPOINTED TO CONSIDER THE LAW RELATING TO INDICTABLE OFFENCES, REPORT,
1879, Cmnd. 2345, at 65. ("[W]hile exempting the person from punishment
under a sentence, [awarding nominal punishment or discharging the person
convicted on his own recognizance] may still leave him subject to the most
serious consequences; for example," forfeiting a pension or being disqualified
from holding a liquor license.).
202. See Proctor v. State, 176 P. 771, 772 (Okla. Crim. App. 1918) (holding
that states cannot criminalize intent alone). See also WAYNE R. LAFAVE &
AUSTIN W. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRumINAL LAW § 25, at 177 (1972).
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the Maine Court in applying the de minimis statute was the
fact that Kargar's convictions exposed him to deportation
under federal law. Pursuant to current deportation
statutes, an alien is deportable if he is convicted of two
"crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a
single scheme of criminal misconduct," even if no prison
sentence is imposed."3 The relationship between such a
potentially harsh consequence and cultural issues is
obvious. By changing the deportation law to focus on the
sentence as well as the conviction, less reason for expunging
the conviction would result, in turn reducing the number of
situations in which the de minimis statute would need to be
applied in the first place. 4
Another positive step would be to retain the primacy of
intent in our criminal statutes, particularly when sex or
family relations are involved. Maine eliminated any state of
mind requirement for conviction under its gross sexual
assault statute,20 5 presumably to preclude defendants from
arguing, for example, that they were too drunk to know
what they were doing when committing criminal acts.06
Revisiting the elimination of any mens rea requirement for
sex offenses makes sense. If a defendant's voluntary
disturbance of his or her mental capacities through alcohol
203. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. 1998).
204. On the one hand, the current trend appears to go in the opposite
direction-less protection of aliens' rights, not more, creating an even greater
need for some sort of escape hatch in exceptional situations. See Note, The
Constitutional Requirement of Judicial Review for Administrative Deportation
Decisions, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1850, 1853-54 & 1863 (1997) (describing the
statutory elimination of habeas corpus and direct judicial review of deportation
orders against certain aliens who are "deportable by reason of having
committed a criminal offense" and the consequent erosion of aliens' due process
rights). On the other hand, immigration law also seems to be gaining some
recognition of cultural distinctions as a justification for refugee status. See In re
Kasinga, Eat. Dec. No. 3278 (B.I.A. June 13, 1996).
205. See Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Hancock, 634 A.2d 1312, 1314 (Me. 1993)
(Glassman, J. dissenting) (stating, "The Legislature opted not to require intent
in cases of gross sexual assault in order to focus the proof in such cases on
whether the victim has been subjected to certain specified conduct by the
defendant providing a specified state of mind in the victim without regard to the
state of mind of the defendant.").
206. See, e.g., State of Maine v. Crocker, 387 A.2d 26, 27 (Me. 1978). Prior to
the amendment of Maine's intoxication statute, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 58-A, the
"existence of a reasonable doubt as to [a culpable] state of mind [could] be
established by evidence of intoxication." Id. The statute was ultimately
amended to preclude intoxication as a defense "unless it establishe[d] a
reasonable doubt as to the existence of an element of the offense." Id. at 27, n.1.
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or drugs were to constitute one way of meeting the required
intent element, then the loophole that generated the
elimination of the intent element would be removed.
Similarly, failure to require actual knowledge of (or reckless
indifference to) the child's age as an element of consensual,
statutory rape... seems inappropriate under current
constitutional principles of due process and privacy
protections.
20 8
Beyond such fine-tuning, however, no drastic changes
in the law are warranted. Indeed, to make significant
change could place culture above other interests and values,
creating a host of problems in defining culture, avoiding
disparate treatment, ensuring that no one is above the law,
and protecting society's interest in collective adherence to
laws enacted by its representatives. Constitutional and
common law jurisprudence already recognizes and protects
the interests reflected in a cultural defense and establishes
a balancing test to weigh those interests against society's
needs. "Culture" is just another category of minority rights
engaged in the never-ending conflict in our legal system
between such rights and majority will. Unnecessarily
exalting one type of minority interest over all others upsets
that delicate balance. Given the safeguards woven into our
criminal justice system, recognition of a formal cultural
defense is both unnecessary and potentially harmful to the
very members of our immigrant communities most in need
of society's protection-women and children.
207. See, e.g., Garnett v. State of Maryland, 632 A.2d 797, 803-804 (Md.
1993) (stating that second-degree rape statute prohibiting sexual intercourse
with underage persons establishes a strict liability offense that does not require
any mens rea and does not allow for a mistake-of-age defense).
208. See generally Benjamin L. Reiss, Alaska's Mens Rea Require-ments for
Statutory Rape, 9 ALASKA L. REV. 377, 377 (1992) (arguing that the "failure to
demand proof of a culpable mental state [for the crime of statutory rape]
conflicts with due process ideals").
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